












The election of President Dwight D. Eisenhower in November 1952 has formed the basis for the traditional Western explanation for the end of the Korean War, denoted by the signing of the Korean Armistice Agreement on 27 July 1953. Historians such as David Rees, Edward Keefer, and Edward Friedman have praised the newly-elected President for accepting something that his predecessor, Harry S. Truman, could not: the possibility of atomic warfare.​[1]​ These historians support the official line espoused by the Eisenhower administration in the aftermath of the conflict, in connection to its New Look strategy with its emphasis on 'massive retaliation', which claimed that US threats to use atomic weapons made in the mid-May 1953 effectively forced the Communists to sue for peace. 
In more recent revisionist accounts of the conclusion of the Korean War, however, Eisenhower's election has been downplayed. Rosemary Foot and Roger Dingman dismiss the nuclear coercion argument claiming that these threats were at most implicit; may not have reached their intended audience; and were probably ignored by the recipients. These historians also stress that at the armistice negotiations the one outstanding question, the post-war fate of prisoners of war, had been resolved before these threats were even made thus paving the way for peace.​[2]​ In addition, William Stueck has emphasised Soviet leader Joseph Stalin’s death on 5 March 1953 as the vital ingredient needed to terminate the fighting. At Stalin’s funeral Premier Georgii Malenkov publicly called for peaceful co-existence between the superpowers and announced a ‘peace offensive’, starting with Korea, to lessen Cold War tensions. Stueck claims that the new Soviet leaders adopted this course since they desired a stable international climate to resolve domestic issues, particularly the economy overstretched by the Korean War and meeting Western rearmament, and while they battled with each other to succeed Stalin as undisputed leader. At the same time, the Soviet Union’s allies fighting in Korea welcomed the peace offensive. Kim Il-sung desperately desired an end to the fighting to allow for reconstruction following the devastation inflicted upon North Korea. Mao Zedong was also frustrated that the People's Republic of China (PRC) had spent considerable manpower and resources, much-needed for modernization, while failing to attain its war aims: control of Taiwan and UN membership.​[3]​
This article will re-examine both the traditional and revisionist arguments since neither fully explains the causes of the end of the Korean War. It is undeniable that Eisenhower’s election and Stalin’s death created the necessary conditions for peace since now both supervisors were actively seeking a means to conclude the conflict. But alone these developments were insufficient to end the fighting since a solution to the outstanding prisoner of war question still had to be agreed by the belligerents. The much-overlooked events at the UN in the immediate aftermath of Eisenhower's election, therefore, were to prove decisive since it was here that such a solution was found. To explain this position, then, the role the Korean conflict played in the 1952 US Presidential Election and how the two presidential candidates differed in their policies towards the conflict will be examined. Next, the crucially important but often overlooked interregnum period between the election in November 1952 and Eisenhower’s inauguration in January 1953 will be looked at. This section will demonstrate that during this short period the United States' Korean War policy at the UN was challenged by a majority of members, including Washington's closest allies, and a resolution sponsored by India was passed that provided the means for ending the conflict. Nevertheless, it was still some time before the conditions were met so that both sides could agree to a cease-fire. The final section thus scrutinises the final six months of the conflict, examining the policies pursued by the Eisenhower administration both within and without the UN, and revealing the process by which it concluded that the answer to the prisoner of war question lay with the Indian Resolution.


The Korean War in the 1952 US Presidential Election Campaign

In the United States the presidential election set for 4 November 1952 created much political upheaval. In July the Democrat and Republican conventions had taken place with Governor Adlai Stevenson of Illinois and General Eisenhower nominated respectively. Stevenson was hand-picked by Truman as his successor, a seasoned politician from a rich political dynasty, and an articulate intellectual. Eisenhower, in comparison, was an illustrious soldier in war and peace time but with no formal political experience who had been recuited by the internationalist wing of the Republican Party determined to block the candidacy of Senator Robert Taft, the leader of the Republican Right.. 
The subsequent election campaigns run by the two nominees were hotly contested on a number of issues, both domestic and international. The personality of the two candidates also played a major part in the campaign. On one hand, Eisenhower was a war hero whose down-to-earth and warm nature made him instantly popular nationwide. Stevenson, on the other hand, was a great orator but his intellectual style, liberal views and privileged background alienated him from many core Democrat voters. Still, one issue concerned American voters above all else: how to end the Korean War. The Truman administration had become synonymous with the bloody conflict fought overwhelming by US troops under the auspices of the UN since June 1950. Moreover, the fighting had continued despite the fact a stalemate at the 38th parallel had been reached in the spring of 1951 and truce negotiations had begun in July that year. Truman’s strategy of fighting a limited war in Korea offered no hope of a decisive victory and appeared to be failing to wear down the will of the enemy. The early popularity in the United States of the Korean War as an act of resistance against Soviet-directed Communist imperialism had, subsequently, given way to disillusionment. In fact, Truman’s Korea War strategy was one of the key reasons why the President had until-then record sixty-six per cent disapproval ratings and decided not to stand again for election in 1952. Yet Stevenson backed this same strategy believing that the alternatives were a humiliating withdrawal or escalating the conflict risking a Third World War.
In stark contrast, Eisenhower adopted a partisan position, heavily criticised Truman’s record in Korea and campaigned to end the war. In addition, Republican foreign affairs guru John Foster Dulles, Eisenhower’s likely appointee as Secretary of State, was publicly very critical of the limited war in Korea despite being a former bipartisan Counsellor in the State Department and initially a strong supporter of the government’s response to the crisis. Still, it was only late in the campaign that Eisenhower made a policy statement on Korea when he famously promised that if elected, 'I will go to Korea'. Although this announcement was incredibly vague, Eisenhower’s military credentials convinced large sections of the electorate that he would bring the Korean conflict to an end. The divergence of policies on Korea was thus central to Eisenhower’s landslide victory, taking over fifty-five per cent of the popular vote, thirty-nine of the forty-eight states, and 442 of 531 Electoral votes.​[4]​


The Interregnum Period and the Korean Question at the UN

Significantly, Eisenhower had said nothing in his campaign regarding the future role of the UN in the Korean War. But it was under the world organisation's umbrella that American troops were fighting and during the first year of the conflict Washington had been able to use its hegemony at the UN, drawn from its unrivaled global influence, to provide a cloak of legitimacy for its policy. The only slight exception to this rule had come following China's military intervention in Korea, and the subsequent crisis at the UN over the winter of 1950/51, when the US Delegation had been forced to delay, and then modify, its proposal to have Beijing branded an aggressor in light of allied concerns. The opening of the armistice discussions in July 1951 had then placed the entire onus of responsibility on the US Government’s shoulders since its military officers undertook negotiations on behalf of the UN. The US Delegation at the UN had also successfully campaigned in early 1952 to have the General Assembly debate on Korea postponed so as not to interfere with the truce talks. 
As a resut, it is somewhat surprising that the impact of Eisenhower's election was felt most immediately and acutely at the UN. To explain this connection it is first necessary to briefly outline the fate of the armistice negotiations up to this point. After getting off to a very rocky start which saw the talks adjourned in late August for 63 days, during late 1951 and early 1952 both sides had demonstrated a genuine desire to end the fighting by agreeing to all aspects of an armistice except the fate of the prisoners of war held by both sides. At the heart of this problem were the 47,000 Chinese and North Korean prisoners being held by the UN Command who claimed they would violently resist repatriation. The American negotiators, on Truman’s instructions, had championed the humanitarian principle of ‘non-forcible repatriation’, effectively giving the prisoners a choice over where they went after the cease-fire. In opposition, the Communist negotiators argued that all prisoners should be repatriated without question in accord with the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War. For political, psychological and propaganda reasons neither side could back down over this issue. This impasse dragged on for over six months until the UN team took the unilateral decision to recess the negotiations.​[5]​
With the truce negotiations in peril attention shifted to the UN since the vast majority of members, including the United States' closest allies, wished to discuss the Korean question at the General Assembly due to open in mid-October 1952. The US government was less eager to take this course, unwilling to share responsibility for negotiating the armistice, but it bowed to the collective will of the UN members. Furthermore, the Truman administration was convinced it would get its own way once again at the UN, using the General Assembly to legitimise its policy.  Indeed, Truman was so confident that the presidential election would not affect US hegemony at the UN that he ignored the urgings of a number of the United States' allies, notably Britain, to have the debate postponed until after 4 November.​[6]​ Moreover, despite the fact the election campaign was coming to a head, Secretary of State Dean Acheson led the US Delegation to the General Assembly in the expectation that the Korean question would be dealt with quickly and he could return to Washington promptly.
The situation on the battlefield, nonetheless, fuelled the sense of urgency at the UN as both sides tried to use military force to press the other to make concessions. First, in early October 1952 massive Communist forces launched an offensive in the strategic Iron Triangle area in central Korea resulting in ten days of brutal fighting and heavy casualties without making any gains. In response, the UN Command launched an offensive of its own in the same area. But the well dug-in Communist defenders refused to budge and following six weeks of intense fighting the UN forces were withdrawn. It was against this backdrop that debate in the General Assembly took place.
Initially, however, the Truman administration’s assumptions regarding the UN debate appeared well-founded. The twenty-one members donating troops or other services to the UN operation in Korea, excluding India, agreed to co-sponsor an American draft resolution supporting the principle of ‘non-forcible repatriation'. This proposal would thus effectively legitimise the position of the UN negotiators at Panmunjom.​[7]​ Also, in the public debates in the General Assembly the United States' closest allies all vocally followed Acheson’s lead and attacked Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Vyshinsky’s rival draft resolution demanding an immediate cease-fire and the creation of a commission composed of countries both directly and indirectly interested in Korea to discuss the repatriation of the prisoners of war.​[8]​ Revealingly, Acheson wrote to Truman at this time that, 'After the first ten days of this session of the General Assembly, I think it is fair to report that things are moving for us perhaps better than we might have expected'.​[9]​
Still, early indications existed that the Americans were not going to get everything their own way. To start with, in response to allied opposition the US Delegation did drop its tentative proposal for a second resolution, expecting the first to be ignored by the Communists, imposing a total embargo on the PRC.​[10]​ Next, the Mexican government, to Acheson's ire, had already informally proposed an immediate cease-fire followed by the reclassifying of all non-repatriate prisoners as political refugees so that they could be granted asylum in any country that was willing to accept them. In addition, a number of British Commonwealth countries, notably Britain and Canada, had only grudgingly sponsored the twenty-one-Power draft resolution, arguing that it sounded too much like an ultimatum, would be rejected by the Communists, and did not contribute towards a peaceful settlement.
By the end of October the seeds of disharmony between the United States and its closest allies were being sown. The impetus for this disunity was provided at a meeting of Commonwealth delegations when V. K. Krishna Menon, a member of the Indian delegation chosen by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru to act as his spokesman on Korea, stated that his government did not support the twenty-one-Power draft resolution.He stressed that such an initiative would inevitably be rejected by the Communist and prolong the war. Menon also outlined his informal proposal for a repatriation commission to take custody of the non-repatriate prisoners of war after the cease-fire and decide upon their final disposition. He claimed this would enable the UN to fulfil its obligations and indicated that New Delhi had been told by Beijing, with whom it held diplomatic relations, that this solution might prove acceptable. This idea was greeted with tentative sympathy by the other Commonwealth members.​[11]​ Acheson, in contrast, immediately dismissed Menon’s proposals as being based on 'nebulous' principles that would create great potential for controversy and breaches in the armistice.​[12]​ 
For the next few days, though, none of the Commonwealth countries explicitly backed Menon's proposals since they were fearful of the US response. But immediately after the presidential election Washington's hegemony at the UN came under its most serious challenge to date. First, Mexico formally tabled its proposal. Next, Peru proposed a draft resolution calling for all non-repatriate prisoners to be sent to a neutral nation where they would remain in custody until a solution could be found. It was the Commonwealth, however, that seized with most alacrity this opportunity to try to find a solution to the prisoner of war question. 
The rallying point for the Commonwealth challenge appeared on 6 November 1952. After the British Delegation had given considerable advice on its drafting, Menon presented his proposal as a draft resolution, consisting of two distinct sections. The first procedural section was a lengthy preamble supporting the UN negotiators at Panmunjom and the principle of non-forcible repatriation. The second substantive section listed seventeen ‘proposals’, with the most important being the establishment of a repatriation commission, consisting of representatives from Sweden, Switzerland, Czechoslovakia and Poland—the four nations already accepted by both sides to serve on the NNSC—plus an umpire appointed by the commission to cast the deciding vote, to take custody of all prisoners after the fighting had ceased. Those prisoners who were willing to be repatriated would be expeditiously returned to their homelands. Over the following ninety days representatives of the belligerents would then be able to explain to non-repatriate prisoners matters relating to their return home. If after this process there remained non-repatriate prisoners, their fate would be discussed at the political conference on Korea. If no decision could be reached there the final disposition of non-repatriate prisoners would be transferred to the UN. The Commonwealth representatives present all immediately voiced their support for this draft resolution over that of the twenty-one Powers.​[13]​ Furthermore, British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, who had purposefully avoided making any comments on Korea until after the US presidential elections, offered public support to Menon. Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs Lester Pearson, likewise, championed Menon’s proposal and saw it as his duty as the current President of the General Assembly to do what he could to bring about a compromise resolution acceptable to all.​[14]​  
Any faint hope of the US government relaxing its position, nevertheless, evaporated when Vyshinsky launched a scathing attack on the twenty-one-Power, Mexican and Peruvian draft resolutions.​[15]​ For Acheson this statement had ‘slammed the door shut’ to finding a compromise solution.​[16]​ The Secretary of State now campaigned to have the twenty-one-Power draft resolution adopted and set about convincing its sponsors to support this course. Yet the Commonwealth’s enthusiasm for Menon’s proposals quickly spread to the majority of the other twenty-one Powers who resisted Acheson’s attempts to have them rally round their own draft resolution.​[17]​ Consequently, the following weeks were characterised by much animosity between the United States and its allies. Acheson, evidently showing the strain of his tenuous position, became increasingly short with his colleagues, dismissed British efforts to incorporate Menon’s proposals with the twenty-one-Power draft and even warned Eden and Pearson that the, 'British and Canadians, in encouraging Menon, were themselves running very great risks'.​[18]​ 
Eden, for his part, did try to meet the Americans half-way and convinced Menon to accept a revised version of his proposals shortening the period prisoners would be subjected to explanations to sixty days.​[19]​ In spite of this concession, Acheson remained intransigent and the Commonwealth countries and other members of the group of twenty-one became increasingly united against US pressure. In light of this support, Menon went ahead and tabled his draft resolution in the General Assembly. Washington was infuriated by this action and focused its pressure campaign squarely on its closest allies. Acheson wrote to Truman, 'Our basic problem has not been Menon, but with the British, Canadians and French…They have grave apprehensions about what the new administration may do as regards Korea…They are very soft on our principles'.​[20]​ The Secretary of State then warned the twenty-one Powers that if the desirability for widespread support was so great that it was necessary to compromise principles, the United States would oppose the Indian draft resolution.​[21]​ The majority of the group of twenty-one, though, remained loyal to Menon. Acheson, therefore, reluctantly sought and received Truman’s permission to break with the allies.​[22]​ 
Crucially, however, Acheson did not find it necessary to exercise these powers. The irreconcilable differences of opinion within the Western alliance were never worked out diplomatically but were effectively aligned by Soviet actions. On 24 November in the General Assembl, Vyshinsky denounced the Indian draft resolution for backing the American principle of ‘forcible detention’. Acheson directly leapt at this opportunity to express publicly that the differences between the Indian proposal and the twenty-one-Power draft resolution were purely linguistic rather than substantive.​[23]​ Why was the Secretary of State so willing to make this concession after vehemently opposing Menon for so long? In short, Vyshinsky’s statement allowed the US government to support the Indian draft resolution in the belief it would never be accepted by the Communists and would not harm US national interests. On the flip side, he firmly held that great harm would been done to the United States’ global position if it broke with its closest allies.​[24]​ 
Subsequently, the US Delegation successfully rallied its allies, themselves relieved that no permanent schism had developed with Washington, to persuade India not to withdraw its proposal now that it was apparent it would be rejected by the Soviet bloc.​[25]​ This decision paved the way for the General Assembly to adopt the Indian Resolution on 3 December 1952 with all members, except the Soviet bloc, voting for it. In contrast, the rival Soviet proposal was overhwlmingly rejected while the Mexican and Peruvian draft resolutions were withdrawn. Even so,  both the PRC and North Korea, as predicted, quickly rejected the Indian Resolution.
A number of reasons explain why during the interregnum period the outgoing Truman administration found its position at the UN challenged. To begin with, the President’s Korean War policy championed by Stevenson in the election campaign had been resoundingly rejected by the American electorate who had spoken in favour of ending the war by voting for Eisenhower. In these circumstances, the departing Truman administration’s policy bore little weight at the UN without the endorsement of the President-elect. Truman tried to address this problem by asking Eisenhower to publicly support the US position in the Korean debate but the General only vaguely promised to consider issuing a statement clarifying his views on Korea which never materialised.​[26]​ Hence the Truman administration was placed in an unprecedentedly weak position.
Vitally, the allies were also worried about the policy the new President would pursue once he took office. Eisenhower had vast international prestige and enjoyed close personal relations with many leaders through his Second World War and NATO experiences. But serious worries were commonplace that the new and inexperienced leader would try to placate the Republican Right by adopting an aggressive Cold War strategy. What is more, despite the diplomatic panache he had demonstrated as Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, many still considered Eisenhower a soldier first-and-foremost who would seek to resolve the Korean War militarily, possibly extending the fighting to the PRC. Rather than bringing an end to a relatively unimportant conflict diverting important resources from more vital theatres as they desperately desired, these governments believed this course would at least prolong the conflict and might even lead to its escalation. Time, they felt, was of the essence and a genuine effort to solve the prisoners of war question, bringing the war to a speedy conclusion, had to be made at the General Assembly before Eisenhower took office.   


Eisenhower’s End-the-War Strategy and the Indian Resolution

As stated at the outset of this article, the Eisenhower administration's strategy to end the Korean War has come under much historical scrutiny. Nonetheless, it is important to re-examine this issue to try to clarify the exact nature of the policy adopted by the new government and its role in the conclusion of the conflict. In particular, one crucial aspect of the story of the final months of fighting has been largely ignored: the role of the Indian Resolution. As will be demonstrated below, the terms of this proposal went on to form the acceptable parameters for negotiations to resolve the prisoner of war question, the only issue preventing a cease-fire after Stalin's death. Furthermore, the existence of the Indian Resolution severely limited the Eisenhower administration's strategy options and meant that it had to dedicate much more attention to events at the UN than it desired.
In January 1953, Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles' highest priority was finding a means to end the Korean War.​[27]​ Still, neither of these two men had a specific strategy in mind for achieving this elusive goal and Eisenhower’s much-hyped trip to Korea the previous December provided no answers. Luckily for the new President, though, he had widespread public support which permitted him a lengthy honeymoon period to consider his options. As a result, the situation on the ground in Korea remained stalemated at the 38th parallel and the UN Command continued to employ a limited war strategy. UN Commander General Mark Clark’s only notable positive initiative was to intensify the bombing campaign against North Korea, targetting irrigation dams resulting in massive floods, in an attempt to break the will of the enemy. This policy had minimal military success and Washington was heavily criticised for its inhumane nature. 
In the meantime, the Eisenhower administration considered how to militarily force an armistice. Dulles was most vocal in these early deliberations calling for an advance to the narrow ‘waist’ of the peninsula between Pyongyang and Wonsan. He claimed that this strategy would create a shorter and more defensible line than the 38th parallel; a politically and economically viable state in South Korea; would not risk Soviet intervention; and would force Moscow to cut its losses and accept a cease-fire.​[28]​ Yet the new fiscally-minded Secretary of Defense, Charles Wilson, as well as the Joint Chiefs of Staff, opposed this move due the considerable loss of manpower and treasure it would entail for minor territorial gains. Eisenhower concurred, fearing that even a limited offensive would create rifts with the allies.​[29]​
While Eisenhower and Dulles were preoccupied with finding a military solution to the conflict they were determined to prevent the UN interfering in its plans. In particular Dulles, despite being one of the co-authors of the UN Charter, had little faith in the world organisation. As he said to Eisenhower, ‘The UN was a good propaganda forum but that it was useless to submit things to it about which it could do nothing, it only builds up the idea of futility’.​[30]​ With the General Assembly resumed in February 1953, then, the US Delegation was instructed to stall any action that might limit future military actions.​[31]​ All the same, the new US Permanent Representative to the UN, Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., was given much leeway to decide on specific policy given the fact he was a Cabinet member, Eisenhower's close friend, and that Dulles' attention lay elsewhere.​[32]​ 
Lodge firmly held that the UN could do little to alter Communist intransigence over the prisoner of war issue and opposed tabling a resolution imposing additional measures on China since this would prove unpopular and have little practical impact.​[33]​  The only choice, in his view, was to champion the Indian Resolution, since this commanded widespread support, and oppose any new proposals more favourable to the Communist position. Specifically, the US Permanent Representative feared that India, unhappy with the apparent failure of its previous attempt, would seek to find a compromise solutiontion.​[34]​ In his opening statement in the General Assembly Lodge, therefore, defended the Indian Resolution as the only means for answering the prisoners of war question, and urged the UN members to remain loyal to it.​[35]​ In opposition, the Soviet bloc members reiterated their criticisms of this proposal. With little hope of finding a breakthrough the Korean debate was then adjourned.​[36]​ Lodge had seemingly achieved his goal.  
 It was only after Stalin’s death on 5 March 1953 that events started moving inexorably towards a cease-fire. The Soviet ‘peace offensive’ mentioned above first manifested itself in a letter sent to the UN Command agreeing to its earlier proposal to exchange sick and wounded prisoners.​[37]​ Soon after on 31 March Chinese Premier Zhou En-lai issued a statement expressing hope that this action would lead to the resumption of armistice negotiations and proposed that following the armistice all non-repatriate prisoners be taken to a neutral country for six months where representatives from their homelands could persuade them to return home. The final disposition of any remaining prisoners would then be determined by the post-armistice political conference.​[38]​ Clearly, Zhou’s proposal represented a major concession and took a massive step towards accepting the terms of the Indian Resolution. For the first time the Communist belligerents had accepted non-repatriate prisoners existed and that their fate should be decided after a cease-fire.
The American response, nevertheless, was muted. Eisenhower felt that Zhou's proposal might offer a solution but Dulles 'proposed to do nothing'.​[39]​ The Secretary of State was wary of getting 'sucked into' an armistice at a disadvantageous moment and preferred to await developments.​[40]​ Eisenhower was also extremely wary of the Soviet peace offensive and wanted the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners to be 'a test of Soviet good faith'.​[41]​ The two men were somewhat surprised then that arrangements were soon put  in place for the exchange of all sick and wounded prisoners of war. This paved the way for the resumption of full armistice negotiations shortly thereafter.
As Operation Little Switch, as the exchange was known, got underway during the first half of April the Korean debate at the General Assembly was rekindled in an atmosphere of expectation. Dulles, conversely, was adamantly opposed to any action at the UN at this juncture concerned that further heated debate might jeopardise rather than facilitate the truce talks.​[42]​ Lodge was, in consequence, instructed to argue that the completion of the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners was a necessary first step before any broader discussions took place in New York.​[43]​ But many members clamoured to take advantage of this opportunity for peace, especially since fears still lingered that the Eisenhower administration may adopt an aggressive military strategy to end the war. Once more leading the way in this drive was Krishna Menon who praised the Chinese initiative and stressed that it could not be ignored by the UN.​[44]​ 
The debate gathered pace when the Polish Delegation, on behalf of the Soviet Union, tabled a draft resolution calling for an immediate cease-fire and the implementation of Zhou's plan.​[45]​ While the Polish proposal gained little support, the Indian and British delegations believed it could not simply be ignored and so suggested a moderate positive draft resolution be formulated that could win the unanimous support of all members, including the Soviet bloc countries. To achieve this goal, they suggested a resolution approving the renewed negotiations at Panmunjom and urging the negotiators to conclude an armistice as quickly as possible.​[46]​ With allied pressure mounting the US Delegation now accepted that some action had to be taken and so proposed a purely procedural draft resolution. This proposal noted the recent agreement on the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners, expressed support for an early cease-fire, and adjourned the General Assembly until an armistice had been signed or developments required discussion.​[47]​
Significantly, with full armistice negotiations now underway the US Delegation was willing to compromise, especially since the American and Indian draft resolutions differed little in substance. A procedural draft resolution was thus formulated that combined elements of the two. It was also agreed that Brazil should sponsor this draft resolution so that the Soviet bloc would be less likely to vote against it.​[48]​ This plan was then put in motion the next day in the General Assembly. The vast majority of members quickly came out in favour of the Brazilian draft resolution although the Soviet bloc members initially continued to promote the Polish proposal. But on 16 April 1953 the Polish delegation unexpectedly withdrew its draft resolution without any explanation. This action allowed for an immediate vote on the Brazilian draft resolution, which received unanimous approval.​[49]​ Two days later the Seventh Session went into recess.
	Even though the Brazilian Resolution was purely procedural, its adoption was significant in a number of ways. To start with, it marked the first time all the UN members had voted in favour of a resolution on Korea. It also clearly indicated that all the UN members agreed that the armistice would best be decided by the negotiators at Panmunjom. And critically, the adoption of this resolution implied that all the member states, including the Soviet bloc, accepted that the outstanding Indian Resolution provided the only answer to the prisoners of war question. This fact was demonstrated during the renewed armistice negotiations, outlined below, in which the Indian Resolution set the acceptable parameters for discussions.
In spite of the adoption of the Brazilian Resolution, however, the Eisenhower administration continued to consider the military means to force a cease-fire. The President had asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to consider ways to force the Communists to sue for peace. Accordingly, NSC-147 was drawn up listing six possible courses of military action of increasing intensity, culminating in the use of nuclear weapons against the PRC. Importantly, unlike his predecessor, Eisenhower did not distinguish atomic from conventional weapons and was willing to explore the possibility of their tactical use to end the war in Korea.​[50]​ NSC 147, though, was not immediately adopted and in the meantime the President attempted to seize the diplomatic initiative from the Communists through his ‘Chance for Peace’ speech delivered on 16 April 1953. Here Eisenhower demanded that the Soviet leadership’s ‘words’ be attested by ‘deeds’ starting with an honourable peace in Korea.
Even so, both sides were now willing to enter into serious negotiations at Panmunjom.​[51]​ The Communist side, evidently eager for peace, was first to concede suggesting a repatriation commission of representatives from Poland, Czechoslovakia, Switzerland, Sweden, and India, be established that would take custody of the prisoners in Korea for four months before the final disposition of the remaining prisoners was determined by the political conference.​[52]​ In effect, this proposal aligned the Communist position with the terms of the Indian Resolution. The Eisenhower administration, in stark contrast, under great pressure from the Republican Right, tabled a reactionary counter-proposal that all Korean non-repatriate prisoners be released while the Chinese prisoners be held for sixty days of persuasion before also being freed.​[53]​ This proposal moved the UN Command position further from the Indian Resolution than ever before. 
Unsurprisingly, the Communists gave this proposal vitriolic treatment but more significant was the outrage this caused within the Western alliance, especially with Britain. Eden preferred the Communist proposal to that of the UN Command and raised doubts over the US Government’s ability to conduct the negotiations alone.​[54]​ Moreover, Churchill thought that Washington was adopting an unduly stiff attitude now that an end to the war was in sight.​[55]​   In the National Security Council Eisenhower thus noted that Anglo-American relations 'had become worse in the last few weeks than at any time since the end of the war'.​[56]​ But this external pressure correlated with the views of cooler heads within the administration. Subsequently, the Eisenhower administration formulated a new proposal accepting the repatriation commission concept and conceding that all non-repatriate prisoners would be held in custody for a persuasion period of 90 days before their final disposition would be decided by the political conference.​[57]​ This latest negotiating position almost exactly reproduced the terms of the Indian Resolution. Under pressure from its allies, the Eisenhower Administration recognised that it could not propose terms radically different from those already given overwhelming endorsement at the UN. Now the two positions were aligned on the Indian Resolution the Communists accepted this proposal within a matter of days.
It was only during the interim period, when the US Government had presented its minimum position, that the Eisenhower accepted NSC-147 and the much-heralded threats to use atomic weapons were made.​[58]​ This was done in three ways. Firstly, while in India, Dulles hinted to Nehru that the United States would escalate the conflict if the Communists did not accept the UN Command’s proposal. It was assumed New Delhi would relay this message to Beijing.​[59]​ Secondly, Clark transmitted a letter to the Communist commanders emphasizing that the talks had entered their 'last stage'.​[60]​ Finally, the US Ambassador in Moscow, Charles Bohlen, emphasised to Soviet Foreign Minster Vyacheslav Molotov the seriousness of the UN Command’s final negotiating position.​[61]​ Yet the impact of these threats was minimal. The Communists had already shown their desire to come to an agreement over the prisoners of war by making significant concessions to align their position with the Indian Resolution. Also, these threats were at most implicit and in the case of the meeting between Dulles and Nehru, the Indian Government denied that it ever passed the message on to China.​[62]​ Furthermore, whether Mao took the threats seriously is doubtful since he had publicly claimed nuclear weapons were a 'paper tiger' and posed little threat to China given its massive population and lack of industrial centres to act as targets. At most, then, the threats made by the Eisenhower administration accelerated the process toward an armistice but agreement had been made inevitable once both sides had accepted the terms of the Indian Resolution. 
Besides, now the prisoner of war issue had finally been resolved, both sides would allow neither South Korean President Syngman Rhee’s devious decision to release 27,000 Korean non-repatriate prisoners nor a final Communist military offensive to recapture territory north of the 38th parallel to stand in the way of an a truce. On 19 July 1953 the final military agreements were reached and the Korean Armistice Agreement was signed by the respective military commanders on 27 July ending three years of bitter warfare.
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